THE CREATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF EUROSCEPTICS POLITICAL SUBJECTS IN CZECH POLITICS

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Abstract
The aim of the article is to analyse the development and programmatic standpoint of the Czech liberal-conservative political stream. We use the concept of Euroscepticism, presented in the works of Szczerbiak and Taggart, and Kopecký and Mudde as the theoretical framework, and develop this concept based on Petr Kaniok’s new typology. In the first part of our analysis we discuss the development of the Eurorealistic faction within the Civic Democratic Party (ODS), and changes in the party’s position towards the EU. We also understand the Eurorealistic faction within the ODS, with Václav Klaus as its supporter and think tanks related to him, as the incubator for the establishment of the Party of Free Citizens (SSO) in 2009. In the second part of the analysis we focus on the party’s programme and its position within the European political arena. Our analysis also includes a discussion about most visible proclamations of the party leaders, against the EU and the European integration process. Our analysis is framed with the general debate about the liberal-conservative party family and its development at the EU level.

Keywords: Party of Free Citizens; Euroscepticism; Eurorealism; anti-EU parties; Conservatives and Reformists Group; Civic Democratic Party; Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy;

1 Introduction
The Czech Republic is among the countries often understood as “problematic” within the institutional framework of and ideological debate about the prospects of European integration. As, for example, the “contrastive” analysis of the Czech and Slovenian EU presidencies showed, the Czech Republic might be understood as a “foot-dragger” and “trouble-maker” within the EU (cf. Drulák, Šabić et al., 2010). Similarly, Kaniok (2014, p. 1) assumes that “the Czech Republic is by many commentators, politicians, but also political scientists considered one of the most Eurosceptic in the contemporary EU. Partly, such opinion is grounded in the behaviour of some leading Czech politicians, as Václav Klaus was, partly in the positions of some most influential political parties, such as the Civic Democratic Party (Občanská demokratická strana, ODS) and related behaviour of Czech governments”.

Naturally, the continually deepening “anti-EU” position of Klaus, former chairman of the ODS (1991-2002) and former Czech President (2003-2013), as well as his contacts and common position with the Irish Eurosceptic Declan Ganley, his provocative equations of the EU with the Soviet Union, and other similar steps, contributed to the Czech Republic’s Eurosceptic label. As well as Klaus, two important think tanks should also be mentioned and included in the analysis of Czech Euroscepticism. These are the Centre for Economics and Politics (Centrum pro ekonomiku a politiku, CEP) and also the Institute of Václav Klaus (Institut Václava Klause, IVK), both directly connected with Klaus.

We may mention, too, some Czech political parties as the most important Eurosceptic players alongside those mentioned above. Analysing the issue in long-term perspective, the ODS should be mentioned in the first place, and above all its Eurosceptic – or in its own words “Eurorealist” – faction. Basically, it was the ODS that started to build up the Eurosceptic image of Czech politics within the European Parliament; its contribution to the establishment of the European Conservative and Reformist group within the EP after the 2009 elections will be analysed deeply in the first part of our contribution. Next to this permanent “trouble-maker”, the conservative and nostalgic ultra-left Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy, KSČM), which has been in the EP continually since 2004, should also be mentioned in this context. However, we decided to limit our analysis, for reasons that will be mentioned later, to only the liberal-conservative Eurosceptic stream of Czech politics, and so the KSČM is not included in the analysis.

2 ODS and the Czech Eurosceptic Stream within the European party system
Naturally, the development within the ODS, and more generally within the Czech Eurosceptic stream, has to be analysed in the context of the development of the European party system after the introduction of direct voting to the EP. As we showed, the ODS tried to change itself from a “secular” liberal-conservative party into a more centrist right wing formation with a Christian basis. This attempt did not succeed, and after 1998 the
Conservative approach was even strengthened. What is more, the ODS joined the already existing group of conservative parties that criticised the “perpetual pro-federal” coalition of Social and Christian Democrats within the EP.

Let us briefly mention that the programmatic collisions within the European People’s Party (EPP) between the Christian-Democratic and conservative parties and party families could already be observed in the 1980s, and that in the first half of 1990s the EPP started to exclude some parties critical of the development trajectory of the European integration project. Nevertheless, the main ideological disputes between the EPP and the international formation of conservative parties, the European Democratic Union (EDU), were resolved at the beginning of the 1990s, as indicated by their institutional integration within the European Parliament group EPP-ED (1999 and 2004). A number of conservative entities, however, kept their distance from this faction, and some later took part in the creation of The EP group Alliance for the Europe of Nations, with clear ties to the Union for Europe of the Nations. Rather strong tendencies also existed within the ED group to create an independent conservative group, or European political party, and it should be noted that the United Kingdom’s Conservative Party played a key role in these talks. The fact that the British Conservatives were drawn to the idea of an independent conservative group within the European Parliament was significantly strengthened with David Cameron’s election as party leader in 2005 (Fiala, Mareš and Sokol, 2007, pp. 51-61; Cabada, 2011, pp. 8-9).

Conservative political parties established themselves in contemporary Europe to the right of the Christian-oriented entities and to the left of the right wing radicals and far right extremists. The inclination of some conservative political parties to cooperate with Christian-Democratic centrists within the EDU and EP group, the EPP-ED, as their logical counterparts, called for the search for an alliance with subjects even more right-oriented than their own conservative family. More important for our analysis is the observation, that the cooperation of conservatives with the right wing radicals, usually offering a mixture of anti-European and nationalist rhetoric (Fiala, Mareš and Sokol, 2007, p. 59 normally indicate these parties as “principally moderately neo-populist”) was perceived as very negative by the Euro-optimistic groups (dominantly by the Christian Democrats, along with the Socialists) in the framework of ideological debate. In our opinion, ODS too, as well as many other right wing political parties from Central and Eastern Europe, were searching for their position within this already ongoing debate. Furthermore, this debate was accelerated with the quick changes to the institutional framework of the EC and EU.

We believe that the Alliance for the Europe of the Nations should be mentioned as a radical group of conservative and populist entities openly expressing disagreement with the dominance of a supranational paradigm within the EU. This disagreement was expressed from a conservative-nationalist, and, naturally, a populist rhetorical platform. This group is important for our analysis because, up to a certain level, it served as an incubator for the development and creation of a conservative group in the EP; Poland’s Law and Justice and Latvia’s For Fatherland and Freedom / The Latvian National Conservative Party can be found among its members after 2004. Some other conservative parties, which criticised the way that Christian-Democratic parties enforced supranational principles within the EU, decided in the end to operate within the EPP-ED group in the EP during the election period 2004-2009. They were looking for a platform to found their own conservative Eurorealist group. Three political parties with a strong position in the national political arena played a key role in this search. They were Great Britain’s Conservatives, Poland’s Law and Justice, and last but not least the Czech ODS (Cabada, 2011, pp. 9-10).

In our opinion, the internal debates within the EPP-ED group led to the logical result that the “pure” Christian-Democratic parties have moved more to occupy centre and supranational positions during the last two decades, while the group of conservative parties moved, or returned, to the right and placed themselves between the EPP and the radical/extreme right that usually uses anti-EU rhetoric. If the creation of the EP group Alliance for the Europe of the Nations after the 1999 elections could be considered as the separation of “anti-European”, populist right wing radical parties, which did not play a key role in domestic politics, then the approaching enlargement of the EU to take in Central and Eastern Europe presented a rather different picture.

It was the Czech Republic’s Civic Democratic Party (ODS) and Poland’s Law and Justice (PiS) that clearly stated in their programmes, rhetoric and alliance preferences their lack of excitement over the idea of inclusion in an EPP controlled by federalist Christian Democrats. Both parties perceived the British’s Conservatives as a key partner, and the Conservatives, pushed to the edge by the Christian Democrats bearing the stigma of “Euro scepticism”, found in both these strong national parties key partners for a more organised critique of strengthening the supranational paradigm within the integration process, stretching beyond the borders of one state.

In July 2003, in connection with the preparations of the Central and Eastern European countries to join the EU, the Conservatives, the ODS and PiS issued a common declaration of their shared interest in promoting a Eurorealist policy; an alternative to the centralisation and federalisation of the Union. The so-called Prague appeal targeted the idea of a constitution for a European super-state and called for the voluntary cooperation of European nations and respect for national differences. The signatories of the appeal were the Conservative leader Iain Duncan Smith, ODS chairman Mirek Topolánek and PiS deputy chairman Ludwik Dorn. After the EP
elections in 2004, doubts arose concerning whether the inclusion of all three parties in the EPP-ED group was suitable. These arose during internal party discussions, as well as in their relationships with the Christian Democratic parties within the EPP, and the parties answered them differently. While the Conservatives and the ODS, despite growing disputes between the EPP and ED, integrated to become the strongest right wing faction of the EPP-ED, Poland’s PiS decided to cooperate within the Alliance for the Europe of the Nations (Cabada, 2011, pp. 11-12).

3 Party of Free Citizens – a Successful Czech “anti-EU” Political Party

As mentioned above, after entering government in 2006, the ODS changed its Eurosceptic position in favour of a more realistic approach. In our opinion, such a change was fully in accordance with the general tendencies in Czech society. The main problematic points of European integration discussed in the Czech public mainstream include the euro (the majority of Czech citizens oppose the adoption of the euro) and “strengthening of decision competences of non-elected EU-institutions/bureaucrats”. The ODS, but also many other important Czech players, including the Czech National Bank, seemed to take no concrete steps towards the adopting the euro. The ODS also criticised contemporary development within the EU. Nevertheless, for some influential hard Eurosceptic figures, with Klaus at the forefront, such a position was too conciliatory.

As Kaniok mentions, the founding of an anti-EU party was expected a few years before the SSO came into reality. “After the departure of Václav Klaus as the party leader, Mirek Topolánek became the new chairman of the ODS, being more conciliatory towards European integration than his predecessor. Simultaneously, in the ODS there permanently existed a Eurosceptic platform that had stressed its interest already in 2001, in the document Manifesto of Czech Eurorealism … Contradictory tendencies escalated at the 19th congress of the ODS in December 2008.” The basic bone of contention was the Lisbon Treaty (LT), which the Eurosceptic faction proposed rejecting the LT, but the leadership enforced the declaration that the decision be left to the ODS MEPs (Kaniok, 2014, p. 5).

Such a Janusian position irritated the hardliners not only within the ODS, but also in the radical think tanks and other civil society institutions with “anti-EU” programmes. Alongside the think tanks (with the Centre of Economics and Politics at the forefront) let us also mention groupings such as “D.O.S.T.” (Enough, the acronym of words Důvěra, Objektivita, Svoboda, Tradice, meaning Trust, Objectivity, Freedom, Tradition), an ultra-conservative formation criticising the EU as a “socialist and immoral structure”. Often, the same figures might be observed within these structures. Integrated around rhetoric that was (ultra) conservative, nationalist, anti-German, partly anti-Semitic, pan-Slavic and pro-Russian (and also anti-Western), anti-gender, “anti-LGBT”, and so on, they criticise the environmental movement and so-called “post-democracy” and “NGO-ism”. Such a mixture naturally produces critics of the EU as a structure that promotes all the above mentioned “negative” trends.

Behind the establishment of the Party of Free Citizens we might also observe this, often partly obscure, “epistemic community”. Nevertheless, we cannot overlook or ignore the fact that these groupings were shielded by Klaus, a generally respected authority with the support of around two thirds of Czech society. In the last part of our analysis we will not follow all the anti-EU players within this very colourful group. Rather, we will focus only on the establishment and development of the Party of Free Citizens.

Starting the analysis of SSO, we have to present the CV of its founder and chairman, Petr Mach. Mach was a student of statistics and econometrics at the University of Economy in Prague, also the alma mater of Klaus. He was active in the Young Conservatives (Mladí konzervativci, MK), an NGO related to the liberal-conservative political parties. Seemingly, he inclined towards (ultra) liberal political and economic thought, founding in 1998 the ultra-liberal review Laissez Faire – časopis pro svobodu jednotlivce (Review for the Freedom of the Individual). From 2003 he started to co-work as an external advisor to Klaus, he newly elected president, and at the same time was acting chairman of the pro-Klausian and Eurosceptic think tank the Centre for Economics and Politics (CEP), established by Klaus in 1998. The CEP is one of the most visible and active Eurosceptic players, organising sets of conferences and workshops and publishing dozens of books and volumes, all of which share a common theme of Euroscepticism; in my opinion, we could observe in this a strengthening of Euroscepticism, developing from a soft form to a hard version. Under Klaus’ supervision, a new generation of active, intelligent and dogmatic Eurosceptics emerged in the CEP, including not only Mach, but also Marek Loužek, Tomáš Munzi and Robert Holman.

If we look at the most visible players within the CEP, they all have economic backgrounds. As Kaniok shows, Mach developed his critiques of European integration from economic positions. In 2003, he published a book called Pitfalls of European Integration (Úskalí evropské integrace), in which he presents two basic ideas. These are that the EU creates an environment that is oriented against competition, and redistributive. Such redistribution might in the short term, be politically expedient, but in the long-term perspective it is disadvantageous. Mach finishes his criticism with a sentence about the “unhealthy roots” of European integration. As an alternative to EU membership he sees “preservation of national sovereignty” (Mach, 2003; cf. also Kaniok, 2006, pp. 24-26).
In our opinion, this position, and Mach’s personal development next to Klaus, shows that the CEP became the most important “incubator” of Czech hard Eurosepticism after the split between Klaus and the ODS. As we showed earlier, the hesitant position of the new ODS leadership towards the Lisbon Treaty can be seen as the symbolic moment of emancipation of this new, independent political stream. Topolánek’s pragmatic and rational pro-European orientation was understood by the “hardliners” as a sign of inconsistency and “weakening”. Thus, in 2009 the Party of Free Citizens (Strana svobodných občanů, SSO) was established. According to Kaniok (2014, p. 1), “many commentators understood the new subject as a Eurosceptic alternative to the ODS”. Many of the leading players of new party had in the past been in the ODS. The party got strong support from Klaus. In the first months of its existence, the SSO rejected the LT and a plebiscite about adopting the euro. Nevertheless, while the possible withdrawal of the Czech Republic from the EU, or even the dissolution of the union, were not the themes, the party manifesto for the EP elections of March 2009 stated explicitly that the Czech Republic could exist without the Brussels institutions. The SSO rejected the LT and the redistribution principle on which European integration is functionally based (Kaniok, 2014, p. 5). In Kaniok’s opinion, the SSO’s programme was unambiguously Euroseptic, and in real terms it tended towards hard Eurosepticism.

For the planned extraordinary elections in autumn 2009, the party prepared its first comprehensive programme. The implementation of a European agreement was declared as the most important foreign policy goal in a document that was presented as an appendix to the programme, and was inspired by an article from the Daily Telegraph, reflecting the failure of the so-called Constitutional Treaty. In October 2009, Mach also declared that, should the LT be adopted, the SSO would demand that the Czech Republic leave the EU (Kaniok, 2014, pp. 6-7). The SSO was not successful in the parliamentary elections, neither for the Chamber of Deputies (2010), nor for the Senate. Nevertheless, we could observe that the party was able to strengthen its position within the domestic political arena. Whereas, in 2010, the party got only 0.74% of votes, it gained 2.46% three years later in the extraordinary elections to the Chamber of Deputies. Although this result did not take the party beyond the 5% threshold, it was nevertheless enough (more than 1.5%) to secure the right to financial support from the state budget, therefore allowing the SSO to organise more effective electoral campaigns, as was the case in the 2014 EP elections.

4 Conclusion

In his original analysis of the development and position of the SSO, Kaniok assumes that the party is not a single issue anti-EU party as far as “its Euroscepticism or the critics of European integration do not present such a ‘single issue’ theme. The position towards the EU in the programme of the SSO is the consequence of its libertarian orientation, and not the cause” (Kaniok, 2014, p. 7). Later, he discusses the SSO based on the concept of a niche party. According to his analysis, the SSO accentuates the EU themes twice as often as mainstream parties (Kaniok, 2014, p. 9). From this, we could derive that the SSO’s development in the domestic political arena will be very important as a next step. As mentioned above, Mach sees Czech domestic politics as more important than the European level. On the other hand, with SSO’s prolonged period of irrelevance at the domestic level, the importance of the European political arena might grow for the party. As Fiala, Mareš and Sokol (2007, p. 235) mention, “anti-EU parties usually succeed above all in the EP elections, and not at the national level”. This is also the reason that the SSO will surely develop a more structured political programme based on (ultra)liberal political philosophy.

In the first part of our analysis we discussed the development of the ODS, and the ECR group within the EP. Alleged Euroscepticism was the strongest argument for criticism of the ECR. Such criticism was mainly based on emotions, and completely lacked an analytical framework and rational reasoning. We personally believe that such a statement is false, that calling for greater reflection on intergovernmentalism, one of the two main paradigms of the European integration process, cannot be presented as negative using political and media stigmas and clichés. The ECR promotes itself as a conservative political formation with two main ideological pillars, liberal conservatives and conservative nationalists. These parties come from “politics where the boundaries between the right and the far right are admittedly sometimes more blurred than in Western Europe” (Bale, Hanley and Szczerbiak, 2010, p. 97).

The establishment of a new anti-EU group, the EFDD, made the distinction between the conservative Eurosceptic party family and the group of hard Eurosceptics more visible. On one hand, we now have a “conservative family of political parties that represents a traditional and important group within the European political environment, which had and still has a significant say in political events in the continental, or union, context, as well as in the majority of the European Union Member States” (Cabada, 2011, p. 16; cf. Cabada, Hloušek et al., 2009). On the other hand, a group of political parties that believe that European integration is damaging in itself has been created. The SSO belongs to this group wilfully, and in full harmony with its political programme. It is difficult to predict further developments. In our opinion, the SSO does not have the potential to force the ODS (despite the fact that ODS lost almost 80% of its voters compared to 2006) from its position as the most important Eurosceptic party within Czech politics and society. One of the possible scenarios is that there will be defections between these two parties, making the distinction between the “Eurosceptical” and “anti-EU” positions clearer.
Should the ODS keep losing voters, cooperation between the parties cannot be excluded. Nevertheless, only a deep crisis in the European integration process can bring more voters to the SSO, in as much as some mainstream parties in the Czech Republic as well as a large part of society are very half-hearted in promoting the EU in the domestic arena.

References


